George Simion and Nicușor Dan will contest the second round of Romania’s presidential election on 18 May. Alexandru Damian writes the election could have profound implications for both Romania and Europe.
Romania is navigating one of the most intense and prolonged electoral periods in its recent history. In just over a year, the country has faced four rounds of national elections (one later annulled) and one round of European elections. On 18 May, Romanians will vote in the second round of the presidential election.
The runoff puts Nicușor Dan, the centrist, pro-EU mayor of Bucharest, against George Simion, a populist and deeply controversial figure who admires Viktor Orbán’s policies, downplays the EU’s importance and vocally opposes Romania’s support for Ukraine. The latter has successfully channelled much of the country’s socio-economic frustration.
The stakes are profound: Romania stands at a crossroads, with the risk of sliding into the ranks of Europe’s illiberal regimes and threatening EU unity in the face of Russian aggression and an unpredictable second Trump presidency. Simion has frequently portrayed himself as a local emissary of the MAGA movement in Romania.
At its core, the 18 May election is a clash of visions: one committed to European integration, democratic institutions and international alliances, and another rooted in isolationism, nationalism and a romanticised, and highly distorted, vision of Romania’s past.
The appeal of the latter is fuelled by public disillusionment with political elites and a widespread distrust of mainstream politics. As in the annulled 2024 election, Romania’s traditional major parties, the Liberals and Social Democrats, failed to send a candidate to the runoff, despite running on a joint platform in 2025.
Europe isn’t the issue, disillusionment is
Much of the debate in the last few months has been reduced to a simple binary divide between the pro-EU/West and the anti-EU/pro-Russian sides. Yet polls consistently show that Romanians remain strongly supportive of EU and NATO membership. According to the November 2024 Eurobarometer, 56% of Romanians trust the EU (above the 51% EU average), and national surveys suggest that three in four Romanians view EU membership as beneficial. Nine in ten oppose any notion of a “ROexit” or leaving NATO.
However, this pro-European sentiment coexists with rising anger over domestic governance. Economic anxiety looms large: 40% of Romanians cite inflation and declining living standards as their top concerns. Trust in public authorities remains very low, driven by the perception that Romania is governed for the benefit of the few, not the many. After five years of cohabitation between the main left and right-wing parties, corruption efforts have stalled, inequality has deepened and political elites appear increasingly disconnected.
This growing disillusionment has fuelled support for extremist and populist parties, which now hold over one-third of seats in Romania’s parliament. The rise of Călin Georgescu, the pro-Russian candidate in the annulled elections of 2024, and now Simion’s advance to the presidential runoff just six months later, are the clearest signs of this shift.
The 2025 electoral landscape has been further complicated by renewed concerns over foreign interference, particularly from Russia. The disinformation ecosystem, already active in 2024, has continued into 2025, especially on TikTok, Telegram, anonymous Facebook pages, and fringe media, which have amplified anti-EU, anti-Ukraine and conspiratorial content.
Many of these messages now align directly with George Simion’s rhetoric, echoing the narratives promoted by Georgescu. We are also witnessing a surge in hate speech across all platforms, with both Georgescu and Simion amplifying hostile and inflammatory messages. The most striking example came this week, when Simion published a threatening blog post rhetorically asking what he would do with those who didn’t vote for him.
A dangerous miscalculation?
What’s even more troubling is how many voters seem to outright ignore the consequences of a Simion presidency. For some, casting their ballot for him is a form of protest: a rejection of the political establishment rather than an endorsement of his platform. They believe Romania will remain anchored in the EU regardless of who wins. Others acknowledge the risks, either politically or economically, but downplay them.
But Simion’s platform is not symbolic. He has spread disinformation about the EU, called the Union a “non-entity”, threatened to nationalise foreign companies and promoted hate speech and conspiracy theories. This rhetoric will not go unnoticed and has real-world consequences.
Normalising it risks alienating Romania from its European allies. It is already having an economic impact and is deterring foreign investment. The warning signs are already flashing: the Romanian leu has weakened to beyond 5 leu per euro, interest rates are rising and borrowing costs are climbing. Meanwhile, Romania faces the EU’s largest budget deficit (over 9%) and the highest rate of inflation (above 5%), all with an underperforming and now fractured coalition government.
Simion’s surge in the first round
On 4 May, Simion won the first round of the presidential election with nearly 41% of the vote, more than he and his disqualified ally, Călin Georgescu, received combined in 2024 (36%). He dominated in most rural and semi-urban areas and across all age groups, except voters aged 18-29 and those residing in major cities. He also won a staggering share of the diaspora vote: 70-75% in the UK, Italy, Germany and Spain. Turnout reached 53%, with record diaspora participation. Simion declared he was stepping in for Georgescu (who is now under prosecution and barred from running), and promised him a senior role in government, possibly even Prime Minister.
Crin Antonescu, the candidate of the governing coalition, came in third with just 20%, despite being supported by three major parties. Rumours suggest that party leaders and local officials, particularly from the Social Democrats, quietly backed Simion. This mirrors 2024, when several Social Democrat mayors openly admitted to covertly supporting Simion at the encouragement of party leadership. Nicușor Dan, running on a pro-European platform and supporting aid for Ukraine, narrowly edged out Antonescu with 21%, a surprising result given his lack of backing from major parties
What will happen next?
Simion enters the second round with a commanding lead, with more than two million votes ahead of Nicușor Dan. For the latter to close the gap, he must achieve broad mobilisation not only in the large urban centres, areas where he has done particularly well, but also in smaller towns and rural areas where Simion currently dominates.
He must also win over a larger portion of the so-called anti-system vote and succeed in convincing larger crowds of the impact of a pro-Simion vote. Still, the race is not over. Pro-EU protests are gaining momentum, with tens of thousands marching in Romania’s urban centres. The first televised debate was also widely perceived as a victory for Nicușor Dan. A shift in voter sentiment is difficult but not impossible.
The implications of a Simion presidency are immense. Domestically, he could establish a Eurosceptic governing coalition, drawing support not only from far-right parties but potentially from the Social Democrats, who have so far refused to endorse any candidate.
A government in the mould of Viktor Orbán’s in Hungary would strain Romania’s relationships with the EU, but also with Moldova and Ukraine, countries that have already banned Simion from entry on national security grounds. His election would fracture EU unity on Ukraine, potentially undermine the bloc’s response to the US trade war and set Romania on a path of geopolitical isolation and economic instability.
A Nicușor Dan presidency would not be without challenges. While it would keep Romania firmly anchored in the EU and committed to European unity, the road ahead would be far from smooth. Internally, the country faces stormy weather as it must make difficult economic adjustments and find ways to ease mounting social tensions.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: LCV / Shutterstock.com
Discussion about this post