For decades, Iran cultivated a network of non-state actors to keep military threats at arm’s length. Arash Reisinezhad writes that while this “forward defence” strategy allowed Tehran to project influence across the Middle East, it has now helped bring Iran into direct conflict with the US and Israel.
One of the most misunderstood factors in the current conflict in Iran is the role of Tehran’s network of non-state military and political actors. Groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas are frequently described in western discourse as Iranian “proxies”, yet this reduces Iran’s behaviour to ideology alone and overlooks the deeper structural forces that shape Tehran’s strategic thinking.
A better explanation lies in the concept of “forward defence”, a strategy that aims to confront threats beyond Iran’s borders rather than inside them. The core logic is straightforward: if potential adversaries can be confronted far from Iran’s territory, the likelihood of direct conflict inside Iran decreases.
But while forward defence helped Iran project power and deter threats beyond its borders, the Gaza War, the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and now the 2026 US-Israel strikes on Iran have exposed the vulnerabilities of this strategy.
Forward defence
Iran’s approach did not originate with the Islamic Republic. Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran supported the Iraqi Kurds in order to contain the threat posed by Arab nationalist regimes in Baghdad. Tehran also established ties with the Lebanese Shia community during the late 1950s.
However, after the revolution, this strategy expanded dramatically. The watershed event was the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88). The invasion of Iran by Saddam Hussein demonstrated the dangers of relying purely on territorial defence. Iranian policymakers concluded that survival required pushing the defensive perimeter outward. The Islamic Republic incorporated these relationships into a broader regional framework often referred to as the “Axis of Resistance”.
Through this network, Iran cultivated political and military partners across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. These alliances enabled Tehran to project influence across a wide geographic area while avoiding direct conventional confrontation with stronger military powers.
Over time, the doctrine expanded to include missile capabilities, drones and asymmetric warfare. A decisive turning point came after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, which removed Iran’s major regional adversary and created a power vacuum, helping Tehran to expand its network of allied non-state groups.
Importantly, this strategy is not simply expansionist. Rather, it is fundamentally defensive from the perspective of Iran’s leaders, seeking to deter threats and increase the cost of attacking Iran. While early revolutionary policy sought to export the revolution, the harsh realities of the Iran-Iraq War gradually pushed Iran toward a more pragmatic geopolitical strategy.
Iran’s strategic loneliness
A deeper driver of Iran’s regional strategy is its condition of “strategic loneliness”. Iran has historically lacked a strategic ally among the great powers at critical historical junctures when its national security and territorial integrity have faced existential threats.
During the Qajar era (1789-1925), Iran attempted to balance Russian and British influence but failed to secure dependable allies. Under the Pahlavi monarchy (1925-1979), close ties with the United States did not eliminate fears that Washington would abandon Iran in a crisis. After the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s loneliness deepened due to sanctions and confrontation with the United States.
Even contemporary partnerships with Russia and China do not fully resolve this dilemma, as both powers treat relations with Iran largely in transactional terms rather than as genuine alliances. Iran has expanded its relations with both countries over the past decade under the framework of its “Look East” policy. However, neither Beijing nor Moscow have extended tangible political or military support to Tehran.
Geographic vulnerability
Geography has also played a powerful role in shaping Iranian strategy. Iran occupies a highly strategic position at the intersection of the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia and the Caucasus. This location makes the country a major geopolitical pivot connecting multiple regional systems.
This creates vulnerability. Iran lacks natural defensive barriers along much of its borders and lies close to major sources of historical threat. Iran is both Persian and Shia in a region dominated largely by Arab and Sunni populations. Throughout history, the Iranian plateau has been invaded by external powers ranging from the Macedonians to the Mongols. Iran has also had geographical proximity to great power competition, particularly between Russia, Britain and later the United States.
Iran’s geographical centrality, revolutionary ideology and intricate tensions with the US have intensified the country’s strategic loneliness. As a result, Iranian leaders have repeatedly concluded that Iran must rely primarily on itself for security rather than on alliances with great powers. This has encouraged the development of forward defence and non-state alliances as alternative mechanisms of deterrence.
Iran’s strategic overreach
Iran’s forward defence has operated primarily through “grey zone” strategies, where geopolitical objectives have been pursued below the threshold of conventional war. These strategies have relied on ambiguity, indirect confrontation and long-term competition.
Key tools have included cyber operations, propaganda, economic pressure and the use of non-state actors such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi militias and the Houthis. Through this network, Iran was able to pursue strategic competition with Israel and the United States without engaging in direct large-scale war.
Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force until his assassination by the United States in 2020, played a crucial role in consolidating this network into a coordinated regional structure. Yet despite its successes, the forward defence strategy incorporated several structural limitations that are now rebounding on Iran.
Chief among these is that managing powerful non-state actors is inherently difficult. These actors can act autonomously and potentially trigger unintended conflicts. The 7 October Hamas attack on Israel, which was reportedly conducted without prior Iranian coordination, offers a clear example.
Sustaining regional networks also requires significant financial resources. Sanctions, economic crises and prolonged conflicts have strained Iran’s capacity to fund its regional alliances. In addition, Iran has struggled to translate military influence into economic or institutional power. While Tehran expanded its presence across the region, it did not build durable economic integration with neighbouring states.
Finally, Iran’s support for armed groups has intensified regional hostility and reinforced the perception of Iran as a destabilising force. This has fuelled international sanctions and strengthened coalitions aimed at containing Iran that are now visible during the conflict with the US and Israel.
The paradox of forward defence
Forward defence has ultimately produced a paradox for Iran. On the one hand, the strategy helped Iran survive decades of external pressure and project influence across the Middle East. On the other hand, it has now put Iran in a geopolitical predicament.
The doctrine emerged as a defensive response to historical insecurity and strategic loneliness. Yet the very policies designed to enhance Iran’s security have intensified regional tensions and brought Iran into a military conflict with the US and Israel. The future of Iran’s security doctrine now rests on the outcome of this conflict.
For more information, see the author’s recent study in the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of LSE European Politics or the London School of Economics.
Image credit: rarrarorro provided by Shutterstock.
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