How will the outcome of the US presidential election affect the country’s future commitment to multilateralism? Tim Heinkelmann-Wild argues that US withdrawal from multilateral institutions predates Trump and might well continue under a Kamala Harris presidency. European leaders should therefore act now to build a more resilient multilateralism without the US.
As the 2024 US presidential election approaches, Europe faces renewed uncertainty about its relationship with the United States. Donald Trump’s potential return to the White House has triggered concerns about transatlantic ties and multilateralism.
His “America First” policy is generally regarded as exceptional, erratic and apocalyptical for the international order. By contrast, Kamala Harris is associated with hopes for normality in the transatlantic partnership and a commitment to a rules-based international order.
At first glance, the two candidates could not be more different. However, treating Trump as an anomaly risks missing deeper, longer-term trends in US foreign policy – trends that Europeans must now prepare for, regardless of the election outcome. To safeguard the rules-based international order that has immensely benefited them, Europeans must draw the right lessons from the past and stop considering Trump’s policies as a mere aberration.
US withdrawal from multilateral institutions is not a Trump phenomenon
The Trump Administration terminated support for or membership of numerous international organisations and agreements. Examples include the Paris Agreement on climate change, the “Iran deal”, the UN Human Rights Council, the World Trade Organization and even the World Health Organization during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Yet while the US withdrawal from multilateral institutions during the Trump Administration was unprecedented in terms of the number and relevance of the abandoned institutions, it should not be overlooked that the US has a long history of ambivalence towards multilateralism.
The US previously terminated its membership of other multilateral institutions, including the International Labour Organisation (ILO) under Jimmy Carter, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) under Ronald Reagan, and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) under Bill Clinton. Moreover, George W. Bush refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Indeed, there are at least three reasons to believe US ambivalence towards multilateralism will persist. First, there have never been so many and so intrusive international institutions, which limit the room for manoeuvre of even the US and thus become targets of contestation. Second, domestic political polarisation in the US is also increasing over international politics, which makes foreign policy decisions in Congress more difficult. Finally, the US is declining relative to rising powers, such as China, and is confronted with increasingly influential blocs of revisionist and illiberal states, such as Russia.
Joe Biden was also subject to these internal and external forces and only selectively followed through on his promise that “America is back” following his election victory. Under Biden, the US has indeed resumed support for some multilateral institutions. Examples include the Paris Agreement, UNESCO, the UN Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization. However, Biden never returned to other institutions, such as the “Iran deal”, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), or the Open Skies Treaty.
Gaps in climate financing were also not completely filled under Biden. We have even seen new protectionist policies under Biden that violate WTO free-trade rules, such as the Inflation Reduction Act. Instead of engaging with or even creating new multilateral institutions, the US under Biden has pursued its foreign policy through selective “mini-lateral” clubs with selected partners.
Europe must therefore overcome its tendency to view Trump as an outlier. The factors driving US withdrawal from multilateral institutions are manifold. Under the next US President – be it Trump or Harris – we will likely see further instances where the US will terminate support for multilateral institutions.
US withdrawal is strategically calculated
A second widespread mistake is to dismiss Trump’s behaviour towards multilateral institutions as irrational, impulsive and erratic. His vociferous and fundamental criticism of multilateral institutions served populist motives of regaining control over foreign policy and putting the national interest first. However, a look beyond his rhetoric reveals the way the US challenged multilateral institutions under Trump followed strategic considerations.
Whether the Trump Administration engaged in criticism, sabotage or exit was shaped by the control the US exercised over multilateral institutions. The more opportunities the US had to change – or at least block – dissatisfying policies within an institution, the more likely it was to limit its attacks. Where it could expect quick concessions due to its strong position of power, it limited itself to criticism.
Trump’s challenge to NATO was limited to criticism, which was quickly met with concessions by US allies. In other cases where the US could block dissatisfying policies, it remained a member and focused on “sabotage”. For instance, the US blocked the WTO’s binding dispute settlement process under both Trump and Biden to prevent binding judgments against its protectionist trade policy. Only where membership offered little advantage did the US opt for exit. For instance, the US withdrew from the Paris Agreement, where it lacked the means to unilaterally prohibit or even shape global climate rules.
US withdrawal from multilateral institutions is by no means unpredictable and erratic but follows a regular pattern. The less control the US retains over multilateral institutions, the more the US has escalated its contestation. To prevent this escalation, European governments can thus rely on concessions within institutions.
They can accommodate US concerns about individual policies or grant more internal leverage by assigning the US veto rights or key positions in organisations. Even if such privileges weaken decision-making in multilateral institutions and run counter to procedural fairness norms, they promise to preserve the relevance of multilateral forums in the future.
Europe can foster resilient multilateralism without the US
A third common misconception is that the rules-based international order is bound to fail without the US. Although the US was instrumental in the creation and maintenance of key multilateral institutions, many institutions have proven remarkably resilient after US withdrawal.
The Paris Agreement, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Trade Organization and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) all withstood challenges by the US under the Trump Administration. With this said, not all institutions survive US withdrawal. UNESCO’s budget crisis and the funding issues faced by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) offer illustrative examples, as do the failures of the Kyoto Protocol, the “Iran Deal” and the Open Skies Treaty.
New leaders can nevertheless fill the gap left by the US. European governments and the bureaucracies of international organisations provided leadership in many of the institutions the Trump Administration withdrew from. In the case of the Paris Agreement, the EU and China took the lead in pursuing global climate goals. The WHO Secretariat also worked closely with European governments to counter Trump’s criticism during the COVID-19 pandemic, while the EU took a leading role in the WTO.
European governments that want to preserve the rules-based international order should therefore be prepared to take the lead in the absence of the US. First, they must continue to champion multilateral institutions and abide by their rules. This will help Europe’s “soft power”, which can be used to win partners. European governments will also have to rely more on non-western partners who can support multilateralism.
Second, Europe should pool and expand its own capabilities, from defence to finance. It is only by working together that Europeans will have enough “hard power” to make a difference on the international stage. It is also important to identify dependencies and reduce them. For example, the European attempt to save the Iran deal failed due to the dominance of the US dollar in the international financial system.
Finally, Europe must actively support the secretariats of international organisations. These bureaucratic actors are not only highly motivated to fight for their organisational survival but are typically committed to the values of their organisations. European governments and the EU would therefore benefit from providing them with greater financial resources and increasing their independence from individual member states.
Note: For more information, see the author’s dissertation and related papers in the Review of International Organizations (co-authored with Benjamin Daßler and Andreas Kruck), Global Studies Quarterly (co-authored with Andreas Kruck and Bernhard Zangl), Global Constitutionalism (co-authored with Andreas Kruck, Benjamin Daßler and Raphaela Hobbach) and the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis (co-authored with Vytautas Jankauskas). This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: Jonah Elkowitz / Shutterstock.com
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