Despite warnings about “war fatigue”, voting patterns in the European Parliament suggest mainstream parties remain firmly supportive of Ukraine. Yet as Adam Holesch, Piotr Zagórski and Aron Buzogány show, divisions over Russia are becoming increasingly pronounced among the populist radical right.
Four years into Russia’s war against Ukraine, the political debate in Europe increasingly revolves around one question: is support for Ukraine beginning to weaken?
A changing geopolitical context, economic pressures and political polarisation have fuelled warnings about “war fatigue” across the continent. Some observers argue that European governments may eventually struggle to sustain their current level of political and financial support for Kyiv, in part due to the withdrawal of the Trump administration.
Yet evidence from European institutions tells a more complex story. Voting behaviour in the European Parliament suggests that mainstream European parties remain remarkably consistent in their stance toward Russia. If anything, the most significant political shifts are occurring elsewhere – within Europe’s populist radical right.
Unity after the invasion
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, political actors across the continent largely aligned behind a common response. Some parties that had previously cultivated friendly relations with Moscow also recalibrated their positions, recognising the political risks of appearing sympathetic to Russia, including some among the far right.
However, political unity forged in crisis rarely lasts indefinitely. As wars become prolonged and their economic and political costs accumulate, opportunities for contestation tend to reemerge and parties can change their positions.
The European Parliament offers a useful arena for examining this issue. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) regularly vote on resolutions addressing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including sanctions policy, military support for Kyiv and broader issues related to Russia and its proxies or Ukraine.
In a recent study, we examine 65 roll-call votes between 2019 and 2025 to track how party positions evolved before and after the full-scale invasion. To measure overall voting patterns, we constructed an Assertiveness Toward Russia Index (ATRI) by aggregating and averaging the selected votes. The index ranges from 0 to 1: votes in favour were coded as 1 (assertive toward Russia), while votes against, abstentions and non-voting were coded as 0. Absent MEPs were excluded.
We distinguish between votes cast before and after Russia’s full-scale invasion to capture possible shifts in actors’ behaviour. We also separate the 9th and 10th European Parliament terms, which provides a useful benchmark for assessing recent developments and changes in the composition of political groups.
Mainstream parties remain consistent in their response to Russia
The results, shown in Figure 1, reveal a clear pattern: mainstream party groups remain consistently supportive of a strong response to Russia, while the populist radical right shows far greater variation.
Across Europe’s major centrist party families – the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP), the centre-left Socialists and Democrats (S&D) and the liberal Renew Europe group – support for a firm stance toward Russia remains consistently high. Renew Europe has been the most assertive group, closely followed by the Greens/EFA and the EPP. Social democratic parties also display high levels of support, although some variation exists among national delegations.
Figure 1: Assertiveness toward Russia in European Parliament groups
Note: For more information, see the authors’ recent study in the Journal of European Integration.
Many parties from these groups hold government positions at the national level and played a central role in designing the EU’s sanctions regime and support policies for Ukraine. Reversing course would therefore carry significant reputational and strategic costs.
Among the groups that typically host far-right parties, we observe far greater heterogeneity. The ECR’s mean scores are moderately high and relatively close to the mainstream groups. By contrast, Identity and Democracy (ID), which mainly featured western populist radical right parties in the 9th parliament and evolved into Patriots for Europe and Europe of Sovereign Nations in the 10th term, records lower assertiveness and a sharp drop in the most recent period.
A divided populist radical right
Unlike mainstream party families, the far right has long been internally divided on Russia. Some parties, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, view Moscow as a direct security threat. Others have cultivated ideological or strategic ties with the Kremlin.
These divisions are clearly visible in European Parliament voting, as shown in Figure 2. Several populist radical right parties remain consistently assertive toward Russia. Poland’s Law and Justice party, the Sweden Democrats and the Finns Party all fall into this category. Latvia’s National Alliance and Fratelli d’Italia also display high ATRI scores.
Other parties, however, show far lower levels of assertiveness. Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD), Austria’s Freedom Party and Hungary’s Fidesz frequently oppose or abstain from resolutions critical of Russia. In some cases, such as Fidesz, their voting behaviour aligns with Russian interests.
Figure 2: Assertiveness toward Russia among populist radical right parties in the European Parliament
Note: For more information, see the authors’ recent study in the Journal of European Integration.
Several far-right parties occupy a middle ground. This group includes several newer entrants to the 10th European Parliament, such as Portugal’s Chega, France’s Reconquête, and Romania’s Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR).
Parties affiliated with the ECR group again show the most assertive stance toward Russia, while those in Patriots for Europe display much lower levels of assertiveness. These group-level patterns are mirrored in the behaviour of individual parties that switched affiliation. The Sweden Democrats and the Finns Party had already adopted a more assertive stance after the invasion of Ukraine and later joined the ECR, where their position became even stronger, in parallel with their countries’ NATO accession.
The opposite dynamic can also be observed. Hungary’s Fidesz, despite its close ties with Poland’s PiS and its Central and Eastern European background, chose to join Patriots for Europe rather than the ECR. Spain’s Vox and ANO from the Czech Republic also joined Patriots for Europe, following which they started voting in a more Russia-friendly way.
A resilient but fragile consensus
Taken together, these developments point to both resilience at the centre and fragility at the margins of Europe’s political response to the war. Mainstream parties across the European Parliament continue to sustain a strong consensus against Russia. Voting behaviour shows little indication that this position is weakening. Similar support is also shown in surveys with citizens.
At the same time, divisions within the populist radical right are becoming increasingly visible. Some parties attempt to mobilise war fatigue by criticising sanctions or calling for negotiations with Russia, while others remain firmly embedded in the broader anti-Russian coalition.
For now, these internal splits limit the ability of populist actors to mount a coherent challenge to Europe’s Ukraine policy at the EU level. But if the war drags on and domestic pressures intensify, the space for political contestation may grow.
Whether Europe’s support for Ukraine remains robust may therefore depend not only on external developments but also on how effectively mainstream parties manage and politically exploit the divisions within the radical right.
For more information, see the authors’ recent study in the Journal of European Integration.
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of LSE European Politics or the London School of Economics.
Image credit: MassimoUsai60 provided by Shutterstock.
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