Radical-right parties made significant gains at the ballot box during 2024. Vicente Valentim argues this success owes much to the normalisation of their views.
Last year was a year full of elections, with almost half of the world’s population being called to the polls. In many of these elections, the radical right made significant gains.
In the US, Donald Trump was elected for another mandate after a campaign marked by a number of racist, anti-democratic and violent remarks. The European Parliament elections saw a consolidation of the radical right as a key player in Europe. And in Austria, the Freedom Party came first in the country’s legislative election under the leadership of Herbert Kickl, who had declared his desire to become a “Volkskanzler” (Chancellor of the people), a term that echoes Hitler’s rhetoric.
It is tempting to read these developments as evidence of voters increasingly “turning to the radical right”. There is, however, one problem with this type of analysis. The political views of voters – on issues like immigration, trust in political institutions or their overall political interest – change slowly, if at all. How, then, can we account for the rapid ascent of radical-right parties like Vox in Spain, which grew from 0.2% of the vote in 2016 to 15% just three years later?
A spiral of silence
This is the puzzle that I try to address in a recent book, The Normalisation of the Radical Right: A Norms Theory of Political Supply and Demand. I argue that much of the growth of the radical right in western democracies is not caused by voters changing their minds and becoming radical right. Instead, it is brought about by individuals who were radical right already, but who did not show those views out of fear of social repercussions – like being judged, losing social connections or being gossiped about.
Indeed, many individuals who support radical-right parties in private – for example, when they cast a ballot – are not willing to admit those views when they interact with others. This generates a spiral of silence where each of these voters underestimate how widespread their views are and, consequently, refuse to voice them.
That radical-right voters often hide their views also has important implications for politicians. Politicians can come to think that if they run for an election on a radical-right platform, they will not be electorally successful. Consequently, they can prefer to join parties with other ideologies or simply avoid running for election.
With fewer politicians to choose from, radical-right parties end up with less skilled leaders who are unable to even mobilise those voters who have radical-right views to vote for them. This is one reason why the radical right was unsuccessful before: not because individuals did not have these views, but because the politicians articulating them were seen as unlikely to win an election. As such, there was no point voting for them because that meant throwing away one’s vote.
Normalisation and electoral success
However, societal shocks – like terrorist attacks or the 2015-16 refugee crisis – can temporarily embolden some voters to voice radical-right views publicly. Learning from this that radical-right views are probably more widespread than anticipated, skilled politicians will often try to mobilise these voters to make an electoral breakthrough.
If such a breakthrough is achieved, it further underlines that radical-right views are more popular than previously thought. As these politicians gain ground and enter political institutions like parliaments or governments, their presence also makes their views seem more legitimate.
The consequence is that what was previously deemed unacceptable becomes normalised, and radical-right voters who used to feel ashamed about expressing their views now feel emboldened to do so. They grow more willing to voice these beliefs in conversations, attend rallies or even engage in acts of extreme-right violence. This is one reason why there is often a peak in this type of behaviour after elections where the radical right performs particularly well.
Seeing the rise of the radical right as a process of normalisation explains why these parties often seem to come “out of nowhere”. Since their growth does not require voters to change their views – a slower process – but simply reflects their previously existing views becoming more acceptable, this process can happen very quickly.
At the same time, this suggests that radical-right parties are not mere “protest parties” whose support will decrease as fast as it increased. Fighting this phenomenon requires more than hoping the success of these parties will fade. It takes a deliberate effort to challenge the exclusionary views that draw voters closer to radical-right ideology. While this may be a slow and difficult process, it is essential for safeguarding the democratic principles of inclusion and tolerance in the long term.
For more information, see the author’s book, The Normalisation of the Radical Right: A Norms Theory of Political Supply and Demand (Oxford University Press, 2024).
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: European Union
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