Can Europe prevent the United States from seizing Greenland? Björn Alexander Düben argues European allies must establish a credible military deterrence to prevent a strategic folly that would destroy NATO.
The most immediate threat to NATO might no longer be Russia’s continued onslaught in Ukraine, but the very real threat of a US military seizure of Greenland. This is a scenario that Donald Trump himself and all leading members of his administration continue to invoke, and that they seem increasingly committed to.
In a rare move of defiance, various senior Republicans have openly criticised these plans, but they have no real power to prevent them. If, in the coming weeks, the US attack on Venezuela on 3 January reveals itself to have been a strategic blunder, this might tamper Trump’s appetite to seek further escalation. But if it is interpreted as a success, then a US military seizure of Greenland becomes even more conceivable.
The logic of Trump’s military action in Venezuela – which, as Trump himself made very clear, was not primarily about democratising Venezuela or law enforcement, but about seizing control of the country and possessing its vast natural resources – has very evident implications for resource-rich Greenland as well.
The Trump administration is barely hiding the fact that its continued aggressive announcements regarding Greenland are primarily about the prospect of expanding US territory and taking possession of natural resources – through negotiation if possible or by force if necessary. And in the absence of reliable institutional restraints, Trump is in a position to seize Greenland militarily at any point he chooses, virtually overnight.
What should Europe do?
Faced with this threat, what should Europe do? First, European NATO allies must be outspoken about the stakes. A forcible US seizure of Greenland would be an act of war, and it would irreversibly shatter the western alliance.
It is hard to think of any scenario wherein NATO would survive such an invasion. If anything, only an empty husk of an institution would remain. Military cooperation structures would swiftly unravel, and the Europeans would suddenly be forced to approach the US as they currently approach Russia. Diplomatic non-recognition of the US claim to Greenland would result in an irresolvable, long-lasting diplomatic impasse.
For Europe, the imperative must now be to prevent this from happening. Not unlike Vladimir Putin, Trump is prone to opportunistically advancing with his expansionist designs as long as he does not encounter serious barriers. These barriers must be set by others.
Sometimes, the only way to avoid a military confrontation is to signal a clear readiness and capacity to use military force of one’s own – in other words, credible deterrence. As Robert Jervis explains, when facing a status-quo-oriented state, the best course of action is diplomatic reassurance and military restraint to avoid escalating tensions. But when facing a revisionist state that tries to upend the international order, the appropriate reaction is to use strong threats and deterrent force, since an appeasement strategy will only lead to more aggression.
Credible deterrence
Since the Trump administration is clearly poised to shatter the global status quo, Europe needs to try its hand at deterrence. But Europe’s armies are no match for the US military – in many respects (including long-distance logistics and battlefield intelligence) they struggle to operate at all without US assistance.
Nonetheless, the Europeans must act now to clearly signal that a military seizure of Greenland cannot be achieved without bloodshed. They must dispel the illusion that invading a NATO ally and annexing its territory can be done in a lawful and politically acceptable manner.
What might happen if this kind of illusion is not dispelled was visible in Ukraine. Those surprised by Russia’s full-scale military invasion in 2022 failed to recall that Putin had begun this war as early as February 2014, when he ordered his military to seize and annex Crimea. In doing so, Putin was already willing to risk an all-out war with Ukraine, since he could not be certain that the Ukrainians would not fight back.
In the event, the new authorities in Kyiv chose to refrain from fighting, almost no lives were lost in seizing Crimea, and the Kremlin could maintain an illusion of normalcy about a reckless act of military aggression and illegal conquest. The ease of taking Crimea and the dearth of international repercussions clearly emboldened Putin to launch his full-scale invasion in 2022 (which he likely expected to have similar results).
One important consequence of Putin’s aggression in 2014 was NATO’s decision to deploy several thousand so-called “tripwire” troops to the Baltic states. Prior to Putin’s attack on Ukraine, NATO had avoided permanently stationing international (multinational) troops near Russia’s borders, as part of its continuous policy of deescalation vis-à-vis Russia, but the events in Ukraine led the Baltic states and Poland to demand more tangible security guarantees.
NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence consists of several battalion battle groups and brigades. These are evidently insufficient to defend against any large-scale Russian invasion on their own. But the rationale is that these troops would act as a “tripwire” to provide time for reinforcements to be deployed from western Europe and, equally importantly, that they would lock the western NATO allies into supporting the Baltic states and honouring their Article 5 treaty obligations to NATO (since the lives of thousands of their own soldiers would be on the line).
A European “tripwire” force for Greenland
If several thousand European troops were deployed as a “tripwire” to Greenland to deter a potential US military invasion, there would be no viable way to provide reinforcements for them if hostilities did erupt. What, then, would be the point of such a deployment?
Although the Europeans would stand no chance in a direct military confrontation against the US, they nonetheless must clearly signal that an invasion of Greenland means nothing short of war, and that the only way the Trump administration could advance its reckless plans of annexation would be to murder its own allies. The only credible way Europeans can do so is to dispatch a (brigade-sized or bigger) permanent troop contingent to Greenland, with clear and public orders to fend off any and all invaders by all means possible.
Naturally, such a deployment would come at an immense cost, both in financial terms but especially politically. Copenhagen would surely welcome such a move, but Washington would be livid, and it might (at the very least) have massive implications for American support for Ukraine, where the US role remains critical.
The Trump administration would doubtlessly ask how European states can dispatch troops to Greenland and position them against the US, while expecting the Americans to defend them against Russia. The most appropriate response to this is that defending Greenland for Europe is part of the defence against Russia, as per Washington’s own security rationale.
As critical as the survival of Ukraine is for European security – and it is critical – it is arguably even more vital to disincentivise Trump from engaging in a strategic folly that would irreversibly destroy NATO. The objective must be to keep Trump at bay for as long as he remains in power and until – hopefully – a more responsible administration picks up the reins in Washington after him.
Prospects for success
Would the Europeans be able to cooperate in taking the drastic measure of deploying “tripwire” troops to Greenland? Vital as it is to do so, this remains doubtful. It is more likely that European capitals will continue to dither until it is too late. That said, European governments can sometimes act with surprising unity, as they did in the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Such a measure would be met with scathing criticism and pressure not just from Washington but from within Europe as well, not least from the ascendant Trump-aligned far right. But mobilising decisively in Greenland before it is too late might be the only viable way to deter an act of aggression that could spell the end for the western alliance.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of LSE European Politics or the London School of Economics.
Image credit: European Union.
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