Diverting scarce military resources to the Indo-Pacific makes little sense at a time when Europe must contain the threat of Russia, argues Peter Harris.
The transatlantic alliance is in trouble, with some Europeans fretting that President Trump is preparing to abandon not just Ukraine, but Europe as a whole – perhaps even exiting the NATO alliance in some form or another. Nobody knows whether Trump’s approach to Europe will continue to be antagonistic. With this president, major reversals in policy are always possible. But it is right that Europeans respond with a sense of urgency to the present crisis in transatlantic relations.
Amid the scramble for a unified European response, one piece of low-hanging fruit risks going underexplored: the case for Europeans to cancel their various “pivots” to the Indo-Pacific. In truth, it was always misguided for Europe’s governments to believe that they could have a sizeable impact on outcomes in Asia, especially in the security realm.
In light of shifting priorities coming out of Washington, however, Europe’s inordinate focus on the Indo-Pacific is borderline reckless. Without delay, Europeans should retrench from the Indo-Pacific and concentrate their scarce military resources much closer to home.
An unaffordable luxury
For a few years, it was almost de rigueur for European capitals to release an Indo-Pacific strategy. Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the European Union have each articulated plans for engaging with the region, most of which emphasise a commitment to upholding a “rules-based order” on the other side of the world. Even governments that lack a codified Indo-Pacific strategy document such as Spain and Italy have taken a noticeably more active role in Asia.
Britain, of course, has been a leader in this regard via its Indo-Pacific “tilt”. Two of its offshore patrol vessels, HMS Spey and HMS Tamar, are deployed permanently to the Indo-Pacific. Later this year, London plans to send the Prince of Wales carrier strike group to Japan. This is in addition to Britain’s sizeable naval presence in the Persian Gulf, arguably the Indo-Pacific’s westernmost extremity.
The French are also active in the region. Two years ago, Paris put on a calculated show of force when three of its Rafale fighter jets took off from the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean and flew 4,000 km to Singapore. The point was to impress upon regional audiences that France is capable of defending its overseas territories in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific and regards itself as an Indo-Pacific “resident power”.
Not to be left out, Germany and Italy have sought to signal their own commitment to Indo-Pacific security. And even smaller countries such as the Netherlands and Norway are seemingly committed to sending naval and airpower assets to the Indo-Pacific.
Why the pivots?
On its face, it is somewhat puzzling that European governments have diverted scarce resources to the Indo-Pacific when their own continent is ravaged by war. The usual justification is that Europe relies upon maritime trade with Indo-Pacific countries and so has a self-interest in ensuring the security of shipping lanes in the Strait of Malacca, the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere. Some analysts take this logic further, arguing that Europe and East Asia belong to the same global security environment for all intents and purposes.
There is something to recommend these points. Global rules are just that – global. If they are broken anywhere, they are weakened for countries everywhere, which means that all governments have an interest in upholding them. And there is no doubt that Europe would feel the economic effects of a major conflict in Asia. But even if the argument in favour of a European forward presence in the Indo-Pacific has some merit, it does not outweigh the case against.
Most importantly, Europe is not militarily strong enough to spare even moderate military resources for the Indo-Pacific. The Russia-Ukraine war is an urgent and serious threat to all of Europe. Ensuring that it ends without horizontal escalation – and that it does not restart – should be the overriding focus of European security policy.
To be blunt: everything that Europeans have at their disposal (and much more besides) will be needed if Europe is serious about deterring future Russian aggression on their continent. It would be different if Europeans could have confidence in the US security guarantee. But with America’s commitment to defending Europe and deterring Russia flagging, it follows that Europeans must rely upon their own military capabilities. In the long-term, this means fielding larger armies, navies and air forces. In the short-term, it means redeploying finite resources to the home front.
Second, even if Europe’s security climate were placid, Europeans have been deluding themselves into believing that they can have a meaningful impact upon Indo-Pacific security. The militaries of Europe are not powerful enough (or near enough) to deter China in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea or anywhere else. It does no good to pretend otherwise.
Europeans could spend heavily to become real Indo-Pacific powers, of course, but only at the cost of eroding their defences against Russia (a point made by Britain’s defence secretary, John Healey, two years ago). When push comes to shove, it will always make more sense for Europe to focus on securing itself from Russia, not East Asia from China.
Third, Europe’s adoption of Indo-Pacific strategies has needlessly antagonised China, fuelling Beijing’s (not unreasonable) perception of the “Indo-Pacific” construct as an anti-China idea. In this sense, Europe has chosen the worst of both worlds: it has picked a fight with China (a major trade and investment partner for most European countries) but without any intention of properly resourcing an effort to contain China militarily.
Finally, Europeans are misguided if they think that bandwagoning with the United States in the Indo-Pacific will curry enough favour with the Trump administration to keep Washington engaged in Europe. No such quid pro quo is on the table. If US leaders want to downgrade relations with Europe, they will do so. The occasional dispatch of one or two European warships to the South China Sea will do nothing to change their minds.
Europe must retrench
European governments must stop sending their naval and air forces to the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, and those with permanent forward deployments in place should consider drawing them down. For Britain, this would mean moving HMS Spey and HMS Tamar back to home waters and downsizing the naval presence in Bahrain. France might similarly consider redeploying its military assets based in Djibouti and Réunion.
If Europeans are worried about the security of trade routes, they should work with regional powers to ensure that shipping lanes remain open. The Arab Gulf states are more than wealthy enough to replace the Royal Navy’s contingent of minesweepers in the Persian Gulf, for example, and capable allies such as Australia, India and Japan can do much more in terms of maritime security in their own vicinities. Needless to say, social and economic ties will remain important. Europe and Asia have much to offer one another in terms of trade, investment, education, tourism and joint technological innovation. If European governments want to pivot to Asia in these terms, nobody should get in their way. But Europe’s military pivot must stop. If Europe is to become more autonomous in its own region, it must accept a lesser role elsewhere.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: European Union
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