The far-right populist movement Pegida has disbanded following a final protest on 20 October. Sabine Volk writes that with the far right performing strongly in the polls, there remain plenty of outlets for disenchanted German voters to express their views.
On 20 October, more than a thousand far-right demonstrators, hundreds of left-wing counterdemonstrators and dozens of police gathered in the city centre of Dresden. Germany’s largest far-right protest group, Pegida, one of the most visible European far-right street movements, had invited people to the city for an event described as its last ever protest on the tenth anniversary of its founding in 2014.
The non-violent event featured speeches and audio messages by prominent German-speaking far-right figures such as former Austrian vice-president Heinz-Christian Strache, Alternative for Germany (AfD) politician Björn Höcke, movement leaders like the identitarian Martin Sellner, and “intellectuals” Götz Kubitschek and Jürgen Elsässer.
If Pegida’s leader Lutz Bachmann can be trusted – and in this case, he probably can be – this was the end of an era. After 250 demonstrations since 2014, he and his colleagues have decided to end their street activism due to health and financial reasons. But it is an open question as to what legacy Pegida has left.
Ten years of continuous activism
Pegida – the “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident” – emerged in Dresden in 2014, less than a year before the so-called migration crisis in Europe. Unexpectedly, the group attracted a large following, with around 25,000 people joining protests in January 2015 against immigration, the visibility of Islam in Germany and the influence of “elites”. In 2016, Pegida co-founded the “Fortress Europe” alliance and mobilised for protest across Europe.
After 2016, Pegida lost importance in the protest landscape, but never disappeared. Even during the COVID-19 pandemic, when street protest was banned for a while, the Dresden group found a way to mobilise for “virtual protest events” on YouTube. Outside of Europe, Pegida offsprings agitated against Islam.
The secret of Pegida’s longevity was the ritualisation of its protest events. Highly standardised since 2015, Pegida’s demonstrations were dense, symbolically charged events. Central to the group’s demonstration calendar were its annual anniversary events which, like its ten-year edition in 2024, featured international guest speakers and attracted much larger crowds.
The far right is not demobilised
After ten years of activism, many view the demise of Pegida as good news for the local and national protest scene, if not for German democracy as a whole. While largely non-violent, the anti-immigrant group had radicalised over recent years, adopting ever more extreme, anti-system rhetoric. In 2021, it was officially declared “anti-constitutional” by the intelligence services.
Yet, Pegida’s demise does not imply the decline of the far right in Germany. Quite the opposite, as the far right has moved from the streets into parliament over the past couple of years. It is now an important electoral force. In regional and European elections in 2024, the Alternative for Germany has emerged as the strongest or second strongest political party across the country. The AfD now has several strongholds, especially in eastern areas that formed the former German Democratic Republic.
Paving the way for far-right party politics
Even though participation in Pegida’s demonstrations fell after 2016, the group’s impact on the country cannot be underestimated. Pegida’s activism made racist and anti-elitist positions and rhetoric more socially acceptable in public discourse.
The fact that protest organisers and demonstrators did not stem from the organised extreme right made their claims seem to stand for the “centre” of German society. Large-scale media reporting about Pegida’s events also amplified racist discourse and contributed to its mainstreaming across the media landscape.
By normalising far-right positions, Pegida paved the way for the ascent of the AfD. Although the AfD was originally founded as a neoliberal anti-euro party, some leading figures in the party claimed to be “natural allies” with Pegida after the movement took off in 2015. The party became split over the issue, with the pro-Pegida camp winning the argument. The AfD was soon taken over by its own radical right wing and scored high at the polls because of – rather than despite – its far-right Pegida-like positions.
Germany’s flourishing far-right protest landscape
Even without Pegida, disenchanted Germans, especially in the east of the country, continue to have protest outlets. During the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous anti-lockdown and anti-vaccination groups, most of them prone to conspiracy theories, mushroomed across the country, especially in smaller cities.
Many of these groups have not been demobilised after the end of the pandemic restrictions, but went with the changing times, for example engaging in anti-American or anti-NATO protests in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. They take to the streets in a ritualistic way similar to Pegida, often demonstrating on Mondays like Pegida did and organising via social media platforms such as Telegram.
What comes after Pegida?
Pegida’s motto was “we came to stay and we stay until we win”. But does the group’s demise mean they won or that they gave up? From a far-right perspective, it could be argued Pegida lost. The “Islamisation” of Germany, as they perceive it, is still taking place, and the fact the country is currently governed by a left-wing government constitutes a failure on all levels. Perhaps this is the reason why Bachmann announced ominous “new formats” of mobilisation.
In turn, from a liberal democratic perspective, it could be argued that Pegida won. Earlier this year, Germany’s left-wing government reintroduced border controls to limit migration flows to Germany, just as Pegida demanded ten years ago. The European Union is also contemplating ways to fortify its external borders.
In other policy areas, though, Germany and Europe are slowly moving toward more progressive politics, for example by increasing the rights of minorities. Pegida and its allies across the world remain far from happy – let’s hope they will not start another protest cycle.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: Lukassek / Shutterstock.com
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