Andrej Babiš’s ANO won the Czech legislative election on 3–4 October. Yet as Jan Rovny explains, Babiš will find it challenging to form a stable government.
The Czech legislative elections held on 3 and 4 October 2025 were a notable comeback for the populist ex-prime minister, and unsuccessful presidential hopeful, Andrej Babiš. His political movement, ANO, received over 34% of the vote, and won 80 seats in the 200-member lower chamber of parliament – a gain of 8 additional seats. But while Babiš celebrated to the sounds of 1980s Italian pop, which I remember from my childhood in communist Czechoslovakia, he faces significant challenges.
ANO’s shift to left-leaning conservatism
As in most western democracies, Czech politics is increasingly cleaved into two poles. One is anchored in the institutions and norms of liberal democracy, and supportive of western international cooperation in the form of free trade, transatlantic defence and European integration.
The other pole is growing sceptical of the benefits of open markets and liberal democracy, which it perceives as engendering unfair competition and unwelcome migration, inducing economic and cultural pressures. The 2025 Czech election saw a congealing of these two poles. It established Babiš’s ANO as the unquestionable hegemon of the illiberal camp, while simultaneously strengthening the most liberal parties on the other side.
Babiš’s ANO started out in 2011 as an anti-system entity of a businessman billionaire, calling for the replacement of traditional political elites with “normal people who work hard”. Flaunting his business prowess, Babiš primarily sought to rally centre-right voters disillusioned with established politics.
Over the last decade, however, he learned that the most receptive ears for his populism stem from the socially weaker and lesser educated voters in Czech regional peripheries. Over time, ANO significantly shifted away from focusing on government efficiency toward selective social policies, combined with an increasingly vocal critique of migration and climate regulation.
This shift is visible in Figure 1, based on recent research I have conducted with my colleagues to place Czech parties on economic and cultural issues over the past decade (from 2014 to 2024). This shows the significant move of ANO from centre-right liberalism toward left-leaning conservatism.
Figure 1: Czech political space and party movement from 2014 to 2024
Source: Compiled using data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey.
In his victory speech, Babiš emphatically repeated that his first cabinet meeting will officially reject the European migration pact, European carbon emissions trading scheme, and focus funding on social security and health care rather than support for Ukraine. Whatever cabinet Babiš puts together, will, however, face important challenges.
Can Babiš form a stable government?
Babiš’s challenge stems from ANO’s unexpectedly strong performance at the expense of smaller radical parties. The Stačilo! alliance, which is built around the Communist party (KSČM) and combines a radial left social platform with nativist nationalism and pro-Russian sentiments, failed to pass the electoral threshold and enter parliament, ensuring another parliamentary term without the presence of historical left-wing parties.
The radical right SPD, which was similarly campaigning on a mixture of social promises, a critique of migration, the targeting of Ukrainian refugees, and strong opposition to the EU, lost votes and five legislative seats. ANO’s dominance of the economically leftish conservative space thus undermines its own potential allies, leaving it in search of stable legislative majorities.
The only possible majority for the illiberal camp would require cooperation – either in a formal governing coalition or Babiš’s preferred ANO minority government with legislative support – with the SPD and the Motorists for Themselves party, who together with ANO hold 108 seats out of 200. But this would be difficult to achieve.
One complication is programmatic incongruence. The Motorists are a new political formation led by businessman and car racer, Filip Turek, a lover of big combustion engines whose collections reportedly include guns and Nazi paraphernalia. The Motorists combine economically libertarian views focused on tax cuts and balanced budgets with masculinist conservatism.
While they would agree with ANO and the SPD on shredding climate regulations and rejecting migration, they are unlikely to swallow the social spending advocated by ANO and the SPD. Furthermore, while ANO and the Motorists criticise the EU, they explicitly reject calling a referendum on Czexit – Czech exit from the EU – which the SPD would welcome. Finding a common political line will thus prove tricky.
Another coalition complication is organisational uncertainty. While the Motorists are political novices, the elected representatives from the SPD’s lists come from a diverse mix of radical right-wing formations, combining various conspiracy theorists, anti-vax crusaders and Putin admirers. While useful in an initial MP headcount, their partnership may prove to be both unreliable and embarrassing.
Finally, Babiš faces a criminal investigation concerning the use of European agricultural subsidies, as well as conflict of interest concerns regarding his vast agro business. The Czech president, Petr Pavel, expects Babiš to comply with all relevant Czech and EU laws, should he task Babiš with forming the next government.
What about the Czech opposition?
The so-called democratic block centres around the “Spolu” coalition of right-wing Conservative (ODS and TOP09) and Christian Democratic (KDU-CSL) parties, headed by the outgoing prime minister, Petr Fiala. The coalition received over 23% of the vote and secured 52 seats (down from 71 in the outgoing parliament).
Fiala’s government, which also included the liberal Mayors’ and Independents’ (STAN) party, led the country through the full scale Russian war on Ukraine, and consequently had to deal with a major inflow of Ukrainian refugees, as well as dramatic energy price increases and associated inflation.
While the coalition played up their role of keeping the Czech Republic on the western side of the opening chasm in Europe, it underestimated the social cost paid by weaker socio-economic groups. In the absence of traditional left-wing parties, the illiberal camp capitalised on popular discontent and fused its cultural conservatism with left-leaning social messaging.
Despite the electoral victory of the illiberal camp, the two most liberal political forces in the country – STAN and the Pirate party – increased their joint seats, particularly due to the success of the Pirates. Campaigning together in 2021, they received 37 (33 and 4) seats. In 2025, STAN reduced its seats to 22, but the Pirates surpassed the SPD to gain 18 MPs (giving the two parties a combined total of 40).
Both parties have proven to be effective political organisations. Both are vocal supporters of cultural openness, for example campaigning in favour of gay marriage. Interestingly, both parties are also increasingly engaging with social issues, overlooked by the previous government, such as housing and social welfare. If effective, their voices from the opposition benches may constrain Babiš’s claim to represent the economically struggling.
Babiš’s Pyrrhic victory
The hardening of the divide between illiberal forces – proposing a mix of exclusionary, nationalist and social policies – and democratic forces – focusing on international cooperation and trade – is bad news for Czech democracy. Figure 2, based on data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, shows how cultural views associate with views on democracy, and the divide between ANO and its possible allies versus the parties of the outgoing government and the Pirates.
Figure 2: Democratic and cultural positioning of Czech parties
Source: Compiled using data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey.
Yet, democrats should not despair. Babiš’s victory is somewhat Pyrrhic. First, his success undermined his own potential allies, making any government he puts together fragile.
Unlike Victor Orbán in Hungary, who has held constitutional majorities for years, any coalition Babiš cobbles together will be small, internally incongruent and organisationally tenuous. And unlike Donald Trump in the United States, Babiš’s government will be checked by the president, Petr Pavel, who defeated Babiš in the 2023 presidential election, and by the Senate, which is dominated by the democratic bloc.
Second, the two blocs are not as solid as they may seem. In fact, the democratic parties may have effective means to reach voters in the left-conservative space that is currently beholden to ANO and the SPD.
Figure 2 additionally demonstrates that the democratic camp includes cultural traditionalists, in the form of the Christian Democratic KDU-ČSL. Their religious conservatism does not preclude a commitment to liberal democracy. Similarly, with another parliamentary term in the absence of traditional left-wing parties, there is a chance that liberal centrists – particularly the Pirate party – will engage with economic issues of social exclusion and welfare more profoundly and systematically.
Democracy everywhere will be on safer ground when democratic parties span the political space, when they cover conservative cultural preferences as well as liberal ones and when they propose transnational openness while seriously grappling with the social costs of open trade and borders. The results of the 2025 Czech legislative election do not guarantee this, but they make it possible.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: photocosmos1 / Shutterstock.com
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