The new UK government is keen to establish itself as tough and competent on migration. Denny Pencheva and Conor Kelly argue the country’s policy on irregular migration should be rooted in pragmatic cooperation with France, Ireland and the wider EU.
One of the first acts of the UK’s new Labour government after winning power in July was to scrap the controversial “Rwanda scheme” pursued by the outgoing Conservative administration. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has nevertheless been keen to show that he takes voters’ concerns about immigration seriously and that he is committed to reducing migration levels.
In the past, Labour has been accused of being too soft on immigration by both the Conservatives and the British media. This was particularly the case during the Labour governments of the mid-2000s, when the party was accused of having an “open doors” policy following the EU’s 2004 enlargement, when large numbers of people from EU accession states in Eastern Europe moved to the UK.
The argument has been less common in relation to asylum seekers and irregular migrants. Indeed, the overall number of asylum seekers settling in the UK since 2000 has been low, with a high number of refusals. Even during the 2015-16 migration crisis, the UK only received 32,414 asylum applications, 61% of which were refused.
For context, this placed the UK ninth in the EU, with the top three recipient countries being Germany (431,000 applications), Sweden and Hungary (163,000 applications each). The complexity of UK immigration rules, the country’s high rejection rates, and the Home Office’s “culture of disbelief” have effectively acted as a deterrent for asylum seekers.
Warmer relations with the EU?
The conditional integration of the UK into the EU before Brexit was another asylum deterrent. The UK opted out of participating in the Schengen Area but chose to opt-into the Schengen Information System, which facilitates police and judicial cooperation. In terms of its ability to tackle transnational crime, the UK could have its cake and eat it.
Further, the UK selectively participated in the wider Common European Asylum System. It was keen on the Dublin regulations that determine which member state is responsible for an asylum claim, as these effectively prevented irregular migrants from physically reaching the UK and logging a claim. In fact, the UK used to send back more asylum seekers than it had to accept under Dublin. The UK also enjoyed greater autonomy within the highly controversial area of immigration detention.
The bilateral Touquet Agreement (2003) between the UK and France further aided Britain in preventing irregular Channel crossings by establishing a mechanism to manage the UK-France border. The agreement allows for reciprocal border controls by deploying French border officials to UK border checkpoints in France and vice versa. However, such bilateral arrangements have become unpopular in France, especially after Brexit, meaning that whatever control Britain has regained over EU economic migration has been lost over irregular migration.
British-Irish relations
The new Labour government’s decision to scrap the Rwanda scheme is likely to have a positive impact on British-Irish relations. The scheme was the focus of a dispute between the previous Conservative government and Ireland, with which the UK operates a common travel area and an “open” post-Brexit border.
The Irish government argued the Rwanda scheme would drive irregular migrants across the land border from Northern Ireland into Ireland, increasing asylum claims there. A senior Irish minister estimated that 80% of Ireland’s asylum claimants were coming via this route, leading some to argue additional checks should take place, irrespective of the common travel area. Unionist politicians pointed out this proposed response flew in the face of Ireland’s stated priority of maintaining an open land border post-Brexit.
In May 2024, a High Court judge in Northern Ireland ruled elements of the Rwanda scheme were incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights and the 2020 EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, which specifically prevents a “diminution” of human rights standards in post-Brexit Northern Ireland, including those contained within the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.
The European Convention on Human Rights was frequently deployed to stymy the Rwanda plan. The UK’s adherence to it also forms the bedrock of the rights framework contained in the Good Friday Agreement, which sought, among other things, to protect Northern Ireland’s communities against sectarian discrimination. After the High Court ruling, the Conservative government argued these rights in Northern Ireland should not prevent harsher measures against migrants. Others have argued such rights are universal.
Push the reset button
Starmer has now declared the Rwanda scheme “dead and buried” and pledged to spend money on increased border security instead. Migration remains a highly divisive issue for Labour MPs and the wider British public alike. The new Labour government will attempt to walk a tight rope between seeking a more secure border and salvaging the UK’s slipping human rights reputation abroad. Achieving this will require respectful and pragmatic cooperation with Brussels, as well as improved bilateral relations with Britain’s immediate neighbours, France and Ireland.
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: Lauren Hurley / No 10 Downing Street (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
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