Italy is set to hold a referendum by spring 2026 on a major constitutional reform of the justice system known as the Nordio reform. Leonardo Puleo writes that while the reform might appear limited in its scope, it could lead to a further weakening of Italian liberal democracy.
On 30 October, the Italian Parliament approved a major constitutional reform of the justice system known as the “Nordio reform”. Since the reform did not secure the two-thirds parliamentary majority required for a constitutional amendment to enter into force, it will now go to a referendum to be held next year.
What is the Nordio reform?
Relations between politics and the judiciary have long been a highly politicised issue in Italy. The post-war party system collapsed in the 1990s following the Mani Pulite (clean hands) investigations, which exposed widespread corruption among governing parties. The subsequent Berlusconi era further intensified tensions due to his multiple judicial proceedings and conflict of interest tied to his media ownership.
The Nordio reform – named after the current Minister of Justice – represents the latest chapter in this long-standing tension and, in this respect, inherits much of Berlusconi’s legacy in reshaping the relationship between politics and the judiciary.
It makes three important changes: separating careers between judges and prosecutors, creating two separate self-governing bodies for judges and prosecutors, and establishing a High Disciplinary Court for both judges and prosecutors.
Separating careers between judges and prosecutors
In the Italian legal system, it is possible for judges to change their roles and become prosecutors, and vice versa. The Nordio reform introduces a definitive separation of these two career paths to prevent this practice. The logic is that individuals who have previously served as a judge or prosecutor could potentially be inhibited from performing their new role effectively, without prejudice.
However, this change is not entirely new. Before the Nordio reform, career mobility had already been significantly restricted by the 2022 Cartabia reform, which allowed only one switch within the first nine years of service. Even before 2022, this practice affected fewer than 0.5% of magistrates. In this sense, the Nordio reform largely codifies a separation that had already been substantively achieved.
Self-governing bodies and the High Disciplinary Court
The core innovation in the Nordio reform is the restructuring of the judiciary’s self-governing body, the High Council of the Judiciary (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura – CSM).
The reform proposes to split the current CSM in two, creating one council for judges and one for prosecutors. Magistrates will be selected for these bodies at random (by sortition), while lay members (university professors and lawyers) will be drawn from a restricted parliamentary shortlist.
The disciplinary section of the CSM will also be abolished and replaced by a High Disciplinary Court whose members, selected by lot, will be drawn exclusively from judges of the Court of Cassation – thereby introducing a hierarchical element previously absent in the Italian judicial tradition.
The government argues the reform is needed to tackle alleged corporatism within the judiciary, which it claims has fostered factionalism and contributed to the politicisation of the CSM. In recent years, the CSM has been marred by several scandals involving the allocation of key positions in the judicial administration. Some scholars of judicial politics have welcomed the separation of careers as a potential means of reducing corporatism and strengthening defendants’ rights.
Does the Nordio reform reduce judicial independence?
The reform does not introduce any explicit mechanism for exercising direct control over the judiciary of the kind seen in Hungary, Poland or Turkey. The separation of careers does not significantly alter judicial functioning – especially when transitions between prosecutorial and judicial roles were already marginal. The changes might therefore appear relatively modest.
What the reform does undoubtedly alter, however, is the balance of power between the judiciary and the executive. The Italian CSM has traditionally represented a cornerstone of external judicial independence – so much so that it served as a model for judicial reforms in several democratising countries from the 1970s onwards.
In this respect, the reform’s primary objective does not seem to be the (already largely accomplished) separation of careers, but rather the weakening of the CSM’s constitutional autonomy and institutional cohesion.
Splitting the judiciary’s self-governing bodies fragments and atomises judicial power, making it more porous to potential executive influence – especially when combined with the sortition process, which significantly reduces the likelihood of coordination among magistrates and thus heightens their vulnerability to political pressure.
Will judges be less likely to oppose the government?
Previous research has shown that dissent and opposition can be costly for judges. Fragmenting the governance of the judiciary ultimately dilutes its constitutional standing and makes political interference more likely.
This is particularly true for the prosecution service, which will be less insulated from external pressure. The weakening of the CSM may therefore encourage prosecutors to adopt positions more aligned with the government’s preferences.
This interpretation is reinforced by the statements of Minister Nordio, who argued the reform would allow politics to “regain the spaces it has abandoned”. He even suggested the opposition should welcome the reform because the transformation “will benefit them too, should they come to power”.
Concerns are also amplified by the government’s confrontational attitude toward the judiciary and other independent institutions. Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini has previously attacked the judiciary over the country’s migration law, arguing that “if they don’t like the migration law, they should run for election”. Italy’s Defence Minister, Guido Crosetto, has also described “judicial opposition” as “the main threat” to the government.
Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, in her trademark plain style, has claimed that many judges display “substantial indifference to the will of the majority”. Nordio himself has insisted that “magistrates cannot criticise bills” – in open contradiction with international standards concerning judicial freedom of expression. These statements underline why many have raised concerns about the impact of the reform.
Weakening liberal democracy
The Nordio reform is not the only constitutional reform Giorgia Meloni’s government has proposed. Another reform known as the “premierato” is also being discussed that would reduce the power of the Italian President and significantly strengthen that of the Prime Minister.
This shift to a stronger executive has been accompanied by restrictions on dissent, including harsher penalties for civil disobedience such as temporary occupations, which under Italy’s new security bill may result in prison sentences of up to 5 years and a €15,000 fine. Taken together, these developments point toward a substantial weakening of liberal democracy in Italy.
Italy’s justice system faces many long-standing issues, and the internal governance of the judiciary is certainly not perfect. Yet the Nordio reform does not address any of the key systemic problems – above all, the excessive length of legal proceedings.
And while the Nordio reform is not on the same scale as the reforms that generated the EU’s rule of law crises in Hungary and Poland, Meloni’s response to these crises is also illustrative. She has previously defended Hungary and Poland by saying that “decisions about citizens’ present and future must be taken by the institutions they voted for, not by magistrates”.
Meloni is effectively capitalising on widespread public dissatisfaction with judicial inefficiency to weaken a constitutional obstacle to her power. In this sense, her Brothers of Italy party is displaying clear parallels with other populist radical-right parties that embody the key features of contemporary illiberalism.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of LSE European Politics or the London School of Economics.
Image credit: Marco Iacobucci Epp provided by Shutterstock.
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