Why does Europe always seem to be in crisis? – EUROPP

Europe and the European Union are frequently portrayed as being in a state of permanent crisis. Elia R.G. Pusterla and Francesca Pusterla Piccin argue that only by rediscovering its responsibility to decide can the EU escape from this cycle.

Why does Europe always seem to be in crisis? Is it always in crisis? When, if ever, was it not in crisis? And which Europe and which crisis are we talking about? In a recent study, we address these questions.

The association between Europe and crisis has been topical for several decades. However, this very fact – that the term “crisis” has long been used in connection with some often-generic idea of “Europe” – should give one pause.

Indeed, an interpretive dilemma swiftly emerges between the risk of overusing the term “crisis” to describe practically everything about Europe and the alternative possibility that everything falling under the “European” label remains inherently linked to the concept of crisis.

Europe and the EU’s “permanent crisis”

The conceptual connection between Europe and crisis is frequently deployed and serves as the logical core to address heterogeneous sets of political themes, arguments and analyses.

These analyses often generate and carry implicit assumptions. Among these is the idea that, when it comes to politics, “Europe” almost automatically stands for the “European Union”. This semantic juxtaposition suggests the very possibility of European politics appears linked to that of the EU.

Indeed, when discussing Europe and its allegedly uninterrupted series of crises, or the EU’s so-called state of “permanent crisis”, one is always establishing a connection between Europe and crisis, while not necessarily grasping the logical depth of that link. Yet, this link originates in a conceptual history that significantly predates the formation of the EU.

The EU’s own way

Before considering the long history of Europe’s relationship with crisis, we need to understand how the EU’s shorter history fits into it. We also need to determine whether, in the relationship between the idea of Europe and that of crisis, a precise logic is at work. Due to the profound connection between “Europe” and “crisis”, it is necessary to examine the EU’s own way of relating itself to both Europe and crisis.

It can be argued that the EU’s permanent crisis is connected to a “critical Europeanness”, where “critical” stands for “crisis” as a “decisive moment” (from the ancient Greek krinō). It follows that the EU’s permanent crisis can appear as a “crisis of crisis” reflecting the EU’s inability to act decisively.

Crisis has indeed been a defining feature of Europe’s history and nature, and, as such, has always kept the European continent engaged in the never fully accomplished, seemingly infinite task of synthesising highly complex and divisive differences across cultural, geographical, philosophical and other orders. But what is stopping the EU from fully embracing this European tradition and turning a crisis into action?

The responsibility to decide

It stands to reason that crises affect political actors at all levels, not just the EU. Yet, if the EU is facing a permanent crisis, it does not follow that this is the same as that faced by other political actors. Indeed, regardless of the EU’s ability to deal with crises, what is striking is that it takes so little to deem the EU inadequate or as something less than a legitimate political entity that brings real added value to politics.

The EU’s activities are often viewed through a lens of Euroscepticism that fails to understand the EU’s actions. This is partly due to the EU’s inability to present itself in a decisive light. Eurosceptics might see more significance in the EU if it presented itself as embodying a political meaning beyond the mere poverty of state institutions.

Consequently, the EU finds itself in the position of having to decisively make critical decisions in accordance with the enormous scope of its European vocation. Paradoxically, the hesitant approach it has adopted – which avoids the language of “sovereignty” and instead adopts the far vaguer notion of the “supremacy” of EU law – is counterproductive.

This approach creates a political void that it is all too easy to criticise as political emptiness or indecision. The EU, by contrast, relates to the great European historical canvas of critical decisions – of bravely deciding what politics must be about, beyond the ideological fences of nation states.

Only by rediscovering and moving forward with its responsibility to decide politically, and the morality this entails, can the EU escape the “crisis of crisis” and finally become, without reservation, European.

For more information, see the authors’ recent study in Politics and Governance.

Note: This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of LSE European Politics or the London School of Economics.

Image credit: European Union.