Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led to a revived EU enlargement policy. Yet as Panagiota Manoli explains, the process still suffers from a deep credibility problem that is fostering mutual frustration between the EU and candidate countries.
The European Union claims that its enlargement policy remains one of its most powerful tools, underscoring its authoritative power and geopolitical actorness. Yet, among elites in the EU member states, the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership countries, a stark paradox has emerged: enlargement is still deemed essential and desired, yet few believe it is effective today.
Once a clear path anchored in reform and merit, enlargement is now widely perceived as situational and reactive, shaped more by ad hoc crisis management needs rather than by a grand strategy. Elite interviews conducted within the framework of the Geo-Power-EU project indicate that long delays in the accession process linked to shifting criteria and strategic ambiguity are the key reasons behind the fading credibility of the EU’s enlargement policy.
Existential necessity and institutional hurdles
Russia’s war on Ukraine forced security back to the centre of EU decision-making and revived enlargement as a geopolitical instrument after years of deadlock. The accession negotiations of Western Balkan countries have sped up, while Ukraine and Moldova have been fast-tracked as candidates.
Yet while the shock of the war changed the rhetoric on the urgency of enlargement and led to a restart of the process, it has not led to a reform of its methodology, despite various tabled proposals. As a result, the policy is caught between existential necessity and institutional hurdles.
There is a persistent perception gap. In Brussels, enlargement is framed as a process that is conditional on the EU’s own institutional capacity, cohesion and deepening. In the Western Balkans, it is perceived primarily as a modernisation and state-building project. For the two Eastern Partnership countries facing Russian aggression, accession to the EU is of existential importance.
Of key concern is the erosion of the conditionality principle as a driver of reforms in the candidate countries. Conditionality was once the anchor of the credibility of enlargement. EU elites blame its fading relevance on a lack of genuine commitment by local political elites to reforms, but the erosion of conditionality signals a wider decline in the EU’s leverage.
On the other hand, references to conditionality raise eyebrows among elites in the Western Balkans, who see something else: shifting goalposts, double standards, politicised benchmarks and the EU’s hypocrisy in not enforcing its own rules consistently. As a result, there is mutual frustration: Brussels blames reform fatigue and aversion, while candidate countries question whether compliance is ever truly rewarded.
Strategic clarity
The credibility deficit comes with a strategic cost for the EU. Trust in EU membership is declining, creating political space for external influence (malign or not). Across the enlargement region, the EU’s inability to translate its normative power into tangible progress weakens its competitive position vis-à-vis rival powers. Domestically, there is a threat of democratic backsliding and a turn towards populism and authoritarianism.
How can the credibility deficit be addressed? Phased or gradual accession has emerged as a pragmatic option to make enlargement a reality and address the trilemma of a merit-based enlargement, geopolitical urgency and EU institutional constraints.
Yet it is widely perceived by elites on both sides (EU and candidate countries) as a stepping stone towards full integration and not an alternative solution. Elites in candidate countries fear remaining in a permanent waiting room or second-tier association that dilutes reform incentives. EU elites worry about governance risks and free riding.
The most damaging perception widely shared is that EU membership has become a perpetual aspiration rather than a reachable reality. That conviction, more than any specific institutional hurdle, undermines enlargement not only as a transformative engine but also as a geopolitical tool.
It is thus increasingly clear that enlargement is now testing the EU’s capacity to act collectively as an actor serving its interests and values. Despite diverse perceptions among elites on the flaws of enlargement policy, what clearly emerges is the urgency for strategic clarity rather than partial policy adjustments.
This article presents research from an accompanying report published as part of the GEO-POWER-EU project.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of LSE European Politics or the London School of Economics.
Image credit: European Union.
Discussion about this post