Europe faces a dilemma in its engagement with China. While closer relations with Beijing could reduce European dependence on the US, it would also risk provoking a harsh response from Washington. Gesine Weber and Zeno Leoni argue that Europe can overcome this challenge if it embraces its role as a middle power.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is making an official visit to China on 25–26 February. His trip follows similar visits by French President Emmanuel Macron in December and Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer in January.
These visits come at a complex time for relations between China and Europe. China’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war and the impact of its trade practices on European markets have been a source of friction in recent years. Yet relations are also now being influenced by transatlantic tensions stemming from Donald Trump’s volatile strategy toward Europe and Asia.
The good news is that Europe can mitigate the impact of these tensions on its China policy. But to do so, policymakers must accept a paradigm shift. Rather than engaging with China and the United States as a great power among equals, Europe could more effectively carve out its own approach by embracing the role of a middle power that has agency, but which cannot fully compete with the great powers in most areas (yet).
Trump cannot be managed
The first necessary step to achieving this is for European governments to drop the belief that US volatility is manageable. The Trump administration’s policies have pushed allies and partners to consider a new approach to China – as illustrated by Mark Carney’s engagement with Xi Jinping. However, many in Europe still believe the actions of the US reflect Trump’s unpredictability rather than genuine recklessness or hostility.
There are reasons to take this view. Trump negotiates aggressively and is willing to generate significant pressure on allies, yet recent episodes suggest an awareness of strategic thresholds and a reluctance to pursue alliance rupture as an end goal. The recent de-escalation over Greenland is instructive because it points to a pattern in which pressure is applied forcefully but ultimately pulled back before irreparable damage is done.
This may lead European leaders to conclude that US volatility can be managed, encouraging them to prioritise short-term stability within existing alliances over longer-term strategic repositioning. This would be a mistake as it would delay necessary adjustments to the now more contested global order and Europe’s place within it.
Engaging with China as a middle power
The second step is for Europe to find a way to engage with China as a middle power. There is potential for this to be successful. One of the reasons European leaders are being warmly received in Beijing is that China is currently seeking to repair relations with Europe.
This engagement is not taking place from a position of strength for Europe. As Beijing experiences economic headwinds and a degree of strategic isolation, Europe might also be running the risk of overestimating China’s capacity and willingness to close gaps left by the US. But China can still represent a pivotal partner for Europe.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of the Russia-Ukraine war. Beijing has taken a position of “pro-Russia neutrality” while simultaneously supplying drone components to Ukraine and remaining one of Ukraine’s top trade partners. With the US increasingly viewed as an unreliable ally, China offers a clear route to exerting influence over Russia – at least in theory, as Beijing has proven little willingness to do so in practice.
It is questionable whether Beijing would use its leverage over Moscow in this way, but there is an obvious incentive for European policymakers to hedge their bets and seek to maintain Beijing’s favour. To quote Gramsci on the interregnum, when “the old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born”, it would be a strategic error to rely solely on Europe’s traditional alliances.
A strategy of multi-alignment would complement this approach, with Europe carefully cultivating relationships across a broader set of actors to preserve flexibility. This must be approached with a sense of realism and without being overawed by improbable scenarios such as the US pivoting to an alignment with Russia.
Playing as a team
There would be many obstacles to overcome with this approach. The pressure the Trump administration has placed on Europe has clearly shown the limits of European power. Europe is deeply aware of how much its security hinges on Washington’s goodwill and how much it is exposed to the risks of US vulnerability. Domestically, many leaders are also increasingly weakened by the rise of the far right.
China is aware of this European weakness. There is a risk Beijing could exploit it by pursuing bilateral agreements with individual states and fracture Europe’s collective posture. If national leaders engage with China individually, they may prioritise domestic economic or political gains over coordinated EU objectives. Early movers risk undercutting later leverage, while latecomers may face faits accomplis.
To fully leverage its strengths, Europe therefore needs to play as “team Europe”, for example by engaging with Beijing through delegations of leaders. This approach would send a strong message to both Beijing and Washington.
A step-by-step approach
With this said, even if Europeans manage to coordinate their actions today, changes in US policy might force them to revisit these tomorrow. It is easy to imagine a scenario where Washington resorts to coercive or punitive measures if European strategies are perceived to undermine US objectives.
This is why a step-by-step approach to strategic autonomy must begin with the development of a consistent and proactive discourse, rather than merely reacting to the US administration. In doing so, Europe can draw lessons from other countries including Singapore, where hedging is a matter of survival, as well as Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa and the Gulf states.
The next step would be to deepen economic relationships with other regions such as MERCOSUR and the CPTPP. Finally, engagement with China should be strategic but not exclusive, particularly as other global actors increasingly shape the international landscape.
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of LSE European Politics or the London School of Economics.
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