Despite being deeply invested in the stability of the Gulf, European states have so far operated on the margins of the conflict in Iran. Kristian Alexander writes that Europe’s approach can best be described as that of a strategic spectator content to engage on carefully calibrated terms that minimise visibility and risk.
The conflict in Iran has once again exposed how quickly regional crises can spill across borders. Several Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have found themselves directly affected despite efforts to remain outside the confrontation.
For Gulf states, this represents a long-feared scenario: a direct US-Iran confrontation unfolding in their immediate neighbourhood and exposing them to retaliation. For Europe, however, the crisis reveals a more nuanced reality. European governments have responded quickly, but within carefully defined boundaries. What has been notably absent is any willingness to assume a decisive security role.
Europe’s position is more complex than simple detachment. While publicly emphasising restraint and de-escalation, several European governments are reportedly providing quiet diplomatic, logistical and intelligence support to US efforts. This dual-track approach underscores that Europe is not absent from the crisis but is instead engaging on carefully calibrated terms that minimise visibility and risk.
Caution without commitment
EU states have consistently called for restraint, emphasised the importance of keeping maritime routes open and worked with Gulf partners to contain the fallout. A joint EU-GCC statement in early March reflected this approach. At the same time, it signalled that Gulf territories should not be used to launch attacks, an implicit message directed not only at Tehran but also at Washington and Jerusalem.
Several European governments, including Germany, France and Spain, have indicated that they will not participate in military operations to secure the Strait of Hormuz while hostilities continue. There has also been little appetite in Brussels to expand existing EU naval missions into the Gulf. Discussions have focused instead on reinforcing current deployments rather than adapting them to a new theatre.
This reluctance underscores a broader institutional challenge: even when European interests are directly affected, the mechanisms required to translate those interests into timely and unified security action remain limited. It reflects not only capability limitations but also political hesitation to transform defensive missions into instruments of broader strategic engagement.
National priorities trump European strategy
If there is a common European position, it lies more in what member states are unwilling to do than in what they are prepared to undertake. France has attempted to preserve some degree of strategic flexibility. President Emmanuel Macron has floated the idea of a multinational maritime effort to safeguard navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, while French forces have repositioned assets, including the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, and deployed Rafale jets to the UAE.
At the same time, Paris has been careful to define its limits. French officials have stressed that these deployments are defensive and have ruled out participation in efforts to reopen the Strait during active hostilities. Instead, France has signalled interest in a post-conflict maritime arrangement that could operate on terms distinct from US-led operations. This reflects a broader attempt to balance strategic autonomy with operational caution.
Germany’s approach has been more restrained. Berlin has focused on crisis management, including the protection of citizens and economic interests, while maintaining diplomatic engagement with Gulf partners. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s engagement with Gulf states highlights Germany’s growing economic and political ties to the region.
German officials have pointed to limited consultation with Washington and uncertainty regarding US objectives as reasons for caution. While maintaining its Atlanticist orientation, Germany has effectively ruled out direct military involvement, reflecting both structural constraints and political sensitivities.
Spain represents the clearest expression of European scepticism. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has openly criticised the US-Israeli strikes and refused to allow Spanish bases to be used for related operations. This position has strained relations with Washington and reflects domestic political sensitivities regarding military engagement.
At the same time, Spain’s stance increasingly mirrors a broader European mood. Across the continent, governments are framing the conflict as one they neither initiated nor control, reinforcing a shared reluctance to assume operational responsibilities in a war shaped by external actors.
Structural limits and political mistrust
Europe’s constrained role is often explained in structural terms. The EU lacks a unified military decision-making framework, and while member states possess capable armed forces, collective EU defence structures remain limited. As a result, responses depend on national political will rather than coordinated action.
Europe’s leverage over the main actors in the conflict is also limited. It remains dependent on the United States for security guarantees through NATO, constraining its ability to shape or oppose American military decisions. Its influence over Israel is similarly restricted, particularly when Israeli actions are framed as existential. Meanwhile, Europe’s diplomatic leverage over Iran has declined significantly since the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement.
More fundamentally, Europe’s diplomatic framework for engaging Iran has largely eroded. The collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has deprived European governments of their primary channel of influence, leaving them without a coherent strategy toward Tehran. As a result, Europe has shifted from a proactive diplomatic actor to a reactive stakeholder, further limiting its ability to shape the trajectory of the crisis.
However, structural dependency alone does not fully explain Europe’s position. The crisis has also exposed a degree of transatlantic mistrust. Dependence on the United States does not necessarily translate into policy convergence, particularly when European governments perceive both strategic and domestic risks.
This dynamic has left Europe in an uncomfortable position. It advocates de-escalation, questions the legality of military action and yet lacks the leverage to shape outcomes. Such a posture reinforces perceptions of inconsistency and highlights the limits of Europe’s ability to act as an effective geopolitical mediator.
Why the Gulf still matters
Despite its limited influence, Europe has strong reasons to be concerned about the crisis. The Gulf remains central to global energy markets. While Europe has diversified its energy supplies following the 2022-23 energy crisis, it remains exposed to disruptions in Gulf oil and liquefied natural gas flows.
European policymakers are increasingly aware of the potential for renewed inflationary pressures and economic instability. The Gulf is also a major trading partner: European firms maintain significant investments across the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, while Gulf sovereign wealth funds are key investors in European economies.
Defence ties further reinforce this relationship. The Gulf remains one of the largest export markets for European defence industries, with European firms supplying advanced military systems and maintaining long-term partnerships in training and maintenance. These systems play a critical role in the Gulf’s ability to counter drones, missiles and other asymmetric threats.
At the same time, the crisis may deepen defence-industrial linkages. Increased demand for air defence, counter-drone technologies and maritime security capabilities is likely to generate additional Gulf investment in European firms, strengthening the interdependence between European industry and Gulf security needs.
Yet while Europe remains deeply invested in the stability of the Gulf, it continues to operate on the margins of the conflict. While this approach may be sustainable in the short term, it raises long-term questions about whether Europe can reconcile its economic exposure with its limited strategic agency in an increasingly contested geopolitical environment.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of LSE European Politics or the London School of Economics.
Image credit: European Union.
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