What Rumen Radev’s victory means for Bulgaria, the EU and Russia

Another election in Central and Eastern Europe, another sweeping success for a new political party. Bulgaria’s parliamentary election last weekend had many strong parallels with Hungary and indeed other recent elections in the region. But there were also some striking differences.

A new party, but an old familiar face

Rumen Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria (PB) was only formed a few months ago but was the clear winner of the election, scooping up over 44% of the vote and a majority of seats (130 out of 240) in the Bulgarian parliament.

In a similar vein to Péter Magyar in Hungary, Radev was able to galvanise different groups of voters to rally behind his new party. Central to his appeal was anti-corruption. In a country bedevilled by scandals, Radev’s promise of a new broom to sweep away corrupt politicians and their system of governance had widespread popularity.

Figure 1: Results of the 2026 Bulgarian election and change in vote from 2024

Source: Bulgarian Central Election Commission.

Such promises are nothing new in a country where scandals mobilise hundreds of thousands of protesters and new parties routinely promise to clean up government. But even by those standards Radev’s success is striking. PB’s 45% debut even eclipsed the 43% won by the former Tsar’s National Movement Simeon II in 2001.

Radev’s success owed much to his stint as the country’s president from 2017–2026. Although the Bulgarian presidency is relatively weak, Radev had used his position during two consecutive terms to send out messages of support to protestors, criticise Bulgaria’s accession to the eurozone, and crucially for his anti-corruption credentials, to veto bills proposed by former prime minister Boyko Borisov.

To many voters, Radev offered not just an expression of discontent, but a belief that the former president might actually be honest and effective enough to end the Groundhog Day of inconclusive elections (eight in five years), reduce the influence of oligarchs and get Bulgarian politics back on a stable footing. A prospect that helps explain why the country saw its highest electoral turnout since April 2021. 

Blend of appeals

Anti-corruption was not the only appeal that attracted voters to Radev’s party. Progressive Bulgaria hoovered up voters from across the spectrum. Although a significant slice of the Gen Z vote swung behind PB, Radev’s Russophile and Eurosceptic rhetoric was well received by former voters of nationalist parties and to some supporters of the once mighty party of Bulgarian politics, the communist-successor, Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP).

As recently as 2017, the BSP had attracted over 950,000 votes, but nine years later it slumped to just a tenth of that figure and fell below the 4% electoral threshold. The demise of the Socialists reflects poor leadership and a succession of strategic errors. However, it also owes much to PB and Radev (whom the party had backed for the presidency) seemingly offering their voters a safe alternative.

Another of Bulgaria’s perennial parties, the Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF), the historic electoral vehicle of choice for the country’s ethnic Turkish population, managed to cross the electoral threshold. But it slipped to 7.1% and lost its dominant position in the south-eastern Kardzhali region long seen as one of its bastions.

Strategic and leadership decisions combined with a damaging party split played their part in the MRF’s poor performance, but the centrality of the notorious figure of Delyan Peevski to both MRF and what Radev described as the corrupt Peevski-Borisov model governing the country, helped lure a chunk of MRF voters to Radev.

The failures of the Socialists and the MRF, two of the pillars of Bulgaria’s post-1989 party system, combined with Radev’s success underscores the changing structure of party competition. Although some international media have labelled Progressive Bulgaria as “left”, the two clear axes of competition in Bulgaria are now the old/corrupt versus a new/clean divide and a geopolitical division between aligning with Russia and aligning with the EU. Radev’s skilful manoeuvre was to position himself clearly on the former divide but be more ambiguous on the latter.

Radev’s political challenge

Viktor Orbán’s defeat in Hungary marks a clear change in foreign policy orientation for Hungary, but Radev’s victory does not necessarily mean one awkward partner in Brussels has been replaced by another. Radev has pro-Moscow leanings, but he is unlikely to become Putin’s puppet in Brussels.

Rather, he is more likely to play a more pragmatic line, balancing energy needs that would benefit from a more Russophile line with the country’s reliance on European funds and investment that would be better served by a pro-EU line. Moreover, Radev will be aware his electoral triumph was built from a coalition of voters with very different foreign policy orientations, some of whom lean towards Moscow and some towards Brussels.

Electoral success brings its own challenges. And as our study of new parties in Central and Eastern Europe shows, new parties face particular challenges. In many cases, we found a new party entering government on an anti-corruption platform is a recipe for living fast but dying young.

Anti-corruption is a powerful mobilising tool. But anti-corruption appeals are easy to make. They are much harder to deliver. Radev may be able to make common cause with the We Continue the Change party, which won 37 of the 240 seats. Once the new anti-corruption kid on the bloc itself, it will support any genuine attempts by Radev to tackle corruption.

While Radev may be able to attract supporters in parliament for any anti-corruption agenda, he will face challenges on his own benches. New parties formed on the eve of elections do not always have the time to undertake vetting or careful scrutiny of candidates.

Progressive Bulgaria’s benches are filled with a mishmash of celebrities, sportspeople, public figures and former members of other parties. Their attachment to Radev’s party may be rather weak and the party could easily fall apart at the seams, particularly as unpopular decisions may need to be made in an era where incumbency is hard for governments across the globe.

Although Radev has achieved the unusual feat of a single party majority in a proportional representation system, the challenges of incumbency mean that while he stands a good chance of forming a government that will last four years, we should not be surprised if it falls short.

Note: This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of LSE European Politics or the London School of Economics.

Image credit: Belish provided by Shutterstock.